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How Much Green for the Buck? Estimating
Additional and Windfall Effects of French
Agro-Environmental Schemes by DID-Matching
Abstract
Agro-environmental schemes (AES), which pay farmers to adopt greener practices,
are increasingly important components of environmental and agricultural policies
both in the US and the EU. Here we study the French implementation of the
EU AES program. We estimate additional and windfall effects of five AESs for
a representative sample of individual farmers using Difference-In-Difference (DID)
matching. We derive the statistical assumptions underlying DID-matching from a
structural household model and we argue that the economics of the program make
it likely that these assumptions hold in our data. We test the implications of the
identifying assumptions, provide a lower bound using triple-difference matching,
test for crossover effects and insert our estimates of both additionality and wind-
fall effects into a cost-benefit framework. We find that the AESs promoting crop
diversity have inserted one new crop into the rotation but on a small part of the
cropped area. We also find that the AES subsidizing the planting of cover crops has
increased cover crops by 10 hectares on the average recipient farm at the expense of
almost 7 hectares of windfall effect. This AES does not appear to be cost effective.
In contrast, we find that the AES subsidizing grass buffer strips could be socially
efficient despite large windfall effects. We finally estimate that the AES subsidizing
conversion to organic farming has low windfall effects and high additionality.
Keywords: Agro-environmental Schemes - Additionality - Windfall Effects - Treatment
Effects - Difference in Difference Matching - Agricultural Practices - Crop Diversity -
Cover Crops - Grass Buffer Strips - Organic Farming.
1 Introduction
Payments for environmental services are widely used to improve environmental outcomes.
Agro-environmental schemes (AESs), which pay farmers for adopting greener practices,
are increasingly important components of environmental and agricultural policies both
in the US and the EU. In this paper, we study the French implementation of the EU
AES program. The AESs that we study aim to alter agricultural practices in order to
improve the environment. Two of the AESs aim to increase crop diversity, which in turn
may increase the diversity of habitats, and thus biodiversity. Increased crop diversity
may also reduce the resistance of weeds to pesticides by diversifying rotations on the
same field. Another AES that we study subsidizes the planting of cover crops during
the winter, which curbs erosion and prevents nitrogen leaching into groundwater. We
also study an AES that subsidizes the planting of grass buffer strips along rivers and
streams. Grass buffer strips contribute to the improvement of surface water quality by
curbing nitrogen, phosphorus and pesticide runoff from fields. Finally, we study an AES
that subsidizes conversion to organic farming. Organic farming bans the use of chemical
fertilizers and pesticides, thereby reducing the transmission of pollutants into ground and
surface water.
Cost-benefit analysis of these programs hinges on the relative extent of their additional
and windfall effects. An AES has an additional effect if it encourages farmers to adopt
environmentally friendly practices, i.e. if it has a positive causal effect on practices that
favor the environment. An AES suffers from windfall effects if it pays for practices that
would have been adopted in its absence. Higher additionality improves the efficiency
of the program and thus increases the benefit/cost ratio. Higher windfall effects, on
the contrary, tend to decrease the efficiency of the program by using resources to pay
for practices that would have been adopted anyway, and thus decreases the benefit/cost
ratio. Because AESs are voluntary programs and requirements and per-hectare payments
are constant for all farmers, the potential for adverse selection is very high: farmers with
the lowest costs of complying with the requirements of a given AES are the most likely
to enter it. Thus, it is very likely that farmers who self-select into an AES would in any
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case have adopted the subsidized green practice to some extent had the AES not been
implemented. In this paper, we estimate additional and windfall effects of the five AESs
described above for a representative sample of French farmers. We use a detailed sample
of individual farmers for whom we have data on practices related to the AESs under
study (crops planted, area under cover crops, grass buffer strips and organic farming)
recorded in 2005, five years after the beginning of the program. We also have data on
farm and farmers’ characteristics and practices before the program started. Finally, we
have detailed and disaggregated information from administrative sources on the AESs
that each farmer has entered.
Determining the average level of a given practice for recipient farmers had the AES
not existed, i.e. the counterfactual level, is key to the estimation of both additional and
windfall effects. The windfall effect is identical to the counterfactual level. The average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) - the relevant causal effect measuring additionality
- is the difference between the average level of a practice in the presence of the AES
and the counterfactual level of the same practice. Unfortunately, we cannot observe
the counterfactual situation. This is an instance of the fundamental problem of causal
inference [16]. If we try to approximate the counterfactual level for recipient farmers
by using non-recipient farmers, our estimates of the ATT are likely to be affected by
selection bias. As a consequence, we may overstate the true level of additionality. Profit-
maximizing farmers self-selecting into an AES indeed have lower costs of complying with
the AES requirements. It is therefore likely that farmers who choose to enter an AES
would in any case have adopted greener practices than farmers not entering it, had the
AES not been implemented.
We use Difference-In-Difference (DID) matching [2, 15] to eliminate selection bias and
to estimate the ATT. DID-matching combines a non-parametric matching procedure with
first-differencing with respect to a pre-treatment period. Matching eliminates selection
bias due to observed covariates by comparing recipient farmers to similar non-recipients.
First differencing eliminates selection bias due to time-invariant unobservable factors.
The validity of DID-matching relies on three assumptions. First, the absence of diffusion
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effects of the AESs on non-recipient farmers. Second, the existence of non-recipient
farmers similar to recipient farmers in terms of observed covariates. Third, in the absence
of any AES, the difference in practices between recipient and similar non-recipient farmers
is constant over time. We derive the statistical assumptions underlying DID-matching
from a structural household model and we argue that the economics of the program make
it likely that the identifying assumptions of DID-matching hold in our data. Moreover,
we test the validity of various implications of these assumptions and find evidence in their
favor. We test for the presence of diffusion effects by inserting the initial average level of
a given practice among neighboring farmers as a control variable. We find no difference
in estimated treatment effects with or without this additional control variable suggesting
that diffusion effects are absent. We test for the existence of similar farmers by using
Smith and Todd [32]’s common support estimation procedure. We generally find that
non-recipient farmers do exist for most of our treated farmers. Finally, we test for the
constancy of the average difference in practices between recipients and non-recipients in
the absence of the program by implementing a placebo test. We compare future recipients
to future non-recipients at two different dates. We find effects of smaller magnitude than
the ATT, and evidence that these are anticipation effects: because the date at which
the requirements will become really binding is uncertain, farmers start complying with
the requirements early on. Indeed, these anticipation effects vanish when we look at
recipients who enter an AES at a later stage. We nevertheless provide a lower bound
on the treatment effect by providing estimates from triple-difference (DDD) matching.
Finally, because farmers can enter multiple AESs and we want to perform a separate
cost-benefit analysis for each AES, we test and find strong support for the absence of
sizeable crossover effects for most AESs under study.
We find that the average recipient farm has planted 10 additional hectares of cover
crops, at the expense of almost 7 hectares of windfall effect. Because the per-hectare
payment for this AES is quite high, and because the social value of cover crops is limited,
this AES does not appear to be cost effective. On the contrary, we find that the AES
subsidizing grass buffer strips could very well be cost effective, despite very large windfall
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effects, because grass buffer strips are very efficient at curbing the runoff of pollutants.
We finally estimate that the AES subsidizing conversion to organic farming has very
low windfall effects and very high additionality. According to our estimates, this AES
is responsible for 90% of the increase in areas converted to organic farming between
2000 and 2005. We estimate that it costs 151 e to convert one additional hectare to
organic farming, compared to an average estimated social benefit from organic farming
of 540 e/ha. We cannot apply a complete cost-benefit analysis to the AESs aiming
at increasing crop diversity because payments were not directly tied to a practice that
we can observe. We nevertheless estimate that these measures triggered the planting of
.65 to .85 new species on treated farms, but on a very limited proportion of the total
farmland, resulting in a small decrease in the proportion of farmland covered by the main
crop (-3%), as well as a slight increase in the crop diversity index. The modest aims of
the AES, only requiring farmers to add one crop to the rotation, might explain the very
limited effects measured. Overall, we find strong evidence of adverse selection, which
induces large windfall effects. We find that the AESs combining restrictive requirements
with large payments, such as the one subsidizing conversion to organic farming, are the
most efficient schemes.
Our paper is not the first attempt at measuring the effects of AESs. The AESs in the
EU are similar to the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the US, in the sense that
the government offers individual farmers or firms temporary subsidies in exchange for
voluntary changes in agricultural practices that are expected to generate environmental
benefits - to reduce crop acreage in this case. Early works include Lynch and Liu [24]
and Lynch, Gray, and Geoghegan [23], who focus on the impact of these AESs on land
prices. Wu [37] and Roberts and Bucholtz [26] run OLS and 2SLS regressions to test the
hypothesis that acreage reductions due to CRP have been offset by increases in cropland
in other areas. Smith and Goodwin [33] estimate a five-equation structural model of
CRP participation, soil erosion, crop insurance participation, conservation, and fertilizer
usage, using a 2SLS procedure, to determine the impact of CRP on soil erosion. Wu,
Adams, Kling, and Tanaka [38] jointly estimate crop choice and the decision to use
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conservation tillage and simulate the effects of CRP on erosion and nitrogen leaching and
runoff. Roberts and Lubowski [27] model the decision to establish crops using a binomial
probit regression to predict the likelihood that each CRP contract will return to crop
production if the program were to expire once and for all. Most, if not all, econometric
studies of CRP are based on a county level database from the United States Department
of Agriculture’s National Resources Inventory, although econometric models are based
on individual farmers’ decisions to enroll land in CRP and change land use. In addition
to the empirical literature on AES evaluation, a growing number of empirical works aim
to estimate the effects of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) voluntary
programs or voluntary international standards (e.g. ISO14001) on firms’ environmental
performances. They run a linear 2SLS regression on micro-data to estimate the impact
of voluntary programs on the release of toxins and on the economic performance of
firms in the US [4, 18] and in developing countries [8]. Arimura, Hibiki, and Katayama
[5] use maximum simulated likelihood along with the GHK simulator to estimate the
impact of the implementation of ISO14001 and publication of environmental reports on
the environmental performance of Japanese facilities. The paper which is perhaps the
closest to our own is the study by Pufahl and Weiss [25] of the effect of benefiting from at
least one AES on farm sales, fertilizer expenditure and cattle livestock density measured
from the bookkeeping records of a non-representative sample of German farms. This
study shows that AESs decreased the use of agrichemicals and increased grassland area.
This paper is organized as follows: the implementation of AESs in France is presented
in section 2; the theoretical model and identification strategy are discussed in section 3;
the data used in the paper are presented in section 4; results of estimations by DID-
matching and robustness checks are presented in section 5; the cost-benefit analysis is
presented in section 6 and section 7 concludes.
5
2 Agro-Environmental Schemes in France
AESs accounted for 37 % of rural development spending for the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) of the European Union in 2006 [25]. The future reform of the CAP will
involve a major “greening” of all subsidies. As a result, a growing share of CAP spending
will take the form of AESs. Taken together, the AESs we study accounted for 22 % of
total spending on AES in France in 2006.
AESs are five-year contracts, with yearly payments and possible checks of how well
the requirements are being met. Farmers may enroll only part of their farm under an
AES, and combine different AESs on the same part of their farm or on different parts.
Farmers receive the same payment per hectare for a given AES. These payments have
been calculated so as to compensate an average farmer for the profit loss following the
adoption of the practice. Total payments are proportional to the area to which the farmer
declares she will apply the scheme. In this paper, we focus on seven AESs. AES 03 (resp.
04) subsidizes the planting of cover crops (resp. grass buffer strips) and thus contributes
to the reduction of nitrogen, phosphorus and pesticide leakage (resp. runoff) from fields.
This in turn decreases the concentrations of pollutants in surface and ground waters.
Among the 03 measures, we focus on those requiring the sowing of cover crops during
winter (0301), since they are the most widely chosen. AESs 08 and 09 aim to decrease the
levels of pesticides and nitrogen applied to the fields, which might also decrease leakage
and runoff. AES 21 encourages conversion to organic farming, a practice that has been
shown to be friendlier to the environment than conventional farming. AESs 0201 and
0205 both aim to increase the diversity of crop rotation, but the former requires the
addition of one crop to the rotation whereas the latter simply requires that at least four
different crops be grown on the farm.
Farmers who wanted to benefit from an AES during this period had to submit a
written application containing an environmental diagnosis of their farm and the particular
measures they were applying for. An administrative body then had to approve or refuse
the application. Almost all applications were approved. A contract was then signed,
stipulating the farmer’s commitments and a schedule of annual payments. The time
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between a farmer’s application and the signing of the contract was at least a year. In order
to submit a valid application, farmers could obtain assistance from local union-run bodies
called Chambres départementales d’Agriculture (CA). The amount of assistance given
to individual farmers by each CA varied widely across France because right-wing CAs
opposed the implementation of these contracts, which formed part of a policy introduced
by a left-wing government. In 2003, an unexpected surge in the number of applications led
the newly elected government to temporarily freeze the scheme. Contracts were gradually
reinstated with an informal restriction on the total payments that an individual farmer
could receive. This delay had not been anticipated by those farmers who had applied to
the AES program; as a result they altered their practices before being officially recorded
as beneficiaries.
3 Theoretical model and identification strategy
In this section, we model an agricultural household deciding whether or not to take part
in a unique AES program and then choosing its level of input. Identification assumptions
are then presented as restrictions on this model. Finally, we deal with the complexities
of the real world scenario in which farmers can simultaneously choose multiple AESs.
3.1 Modeling farmers’ participation in an AES
We model a household making two sequential decisions. First, it decides whether or not
to enter an AES. Second, the household chooses the level of inputs that maximizes its
utility in relation to the AES constraints. We solve this problem by backward induction,
so that we first focus on production decisions and how the AES impacts them, and then
consider the household’s decision to enter the scheme.1
Input choices with and without the AES
The household produces only one agricultural good, whose price is pQ, in quantity Q,
by combining a variable input Y whose price is pY with household labor (H) and other
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factors of production. These consist of the fixed factors possessed by the household,
like physical and human capital and land, stored in the vector I and unobserved (by
the evaluator but not by the farmer) factors like managerial ability, land quality and
climate variations, gathered in the vector . The production function F is such that:
Q = F (Y,H, I, ). Among the unobserved factors , we distinguish between factors fixed
over time (like managerial ability and land quality, noted as µ) and those that vary over
time (like climate variations, noted as e). We thus have  = (µ, e).
When a household has entered an AES (D = 1) it receives payments P as compensa-
tion for making restricted use of inputs Y , so that Y ≤ Y¯ .2 The household derives income
from farming but also from working Hoff hours off the farm for a wage w. It derives utility
from consumption C, leisure L, on-farm work [22, 10], and may exhibit a particular dis-
taste for some inputs, due for example to ecological preferences. Heterogeneity in tastes
is described by two vectors: observed consumption shifters (family size, age of children,
etc.): S and unobserved taste shifters: η. Here again we make a distinction between
unobserved shifters that are fixed over time (like ecological preferences, taste for work
on the farm, noted δ) and time-varying idiosyncratic taste shifters (like non-farm profit
opportunities, noted n). We thus have η = (δ,n). The problem the household faces is:
max
C,L,H,Hoff,Y
U(C,L,H, Y,S,η) (1)
subject to:
C = pQQ− pY Y + wHoff +DP (2)
Q = F (Y,H, I, ) (3)
D(Y − Y¯ ) ≤ 0 (4)
L+H +Hoff = T (5)
where T is the total time available to the household. The first order condition for the
input level is (with λY the Lagrange multiplier associated with the input constraint):
∂U
∂C
(
pQ
∂F
∂Y
− pY
)
+ ∂U
∂Y
− λYD = 0. (6)
8
In the absence of the AES (i.e. when D = 0 in equation (6)), the household chooses the
input level Y 0 that equalizes the marginal increase in utility, due to a marginal increase
in agricultural profits, with the marginal disutility of using inputs. This level depends on
all the exogenous variables of the problem, including household characteristics S and η,
as production decisions are not separable from consumption:3
Y 0 = g0(pQ, pY , w, T, I,S, ,η). (7)
When in the AES (i.e. when D = 1 in equation (6)), either the input constraint is
binding, so that Y 1 = Y¯ , or the input constraint is not binding (λY = 0), and Y 1 ≤ Y¯ .
Generally, we have:
Y 1 = g1(P, Y¯ , pQ, pY , w, T, I,S, ,η). (8)
Y 1 and Y 0 are called potential outcomes. The individual-level causal effect of the AES
(∆Y ) is the difference between the input level chosen by the household if it enters the
AES and the input level it chooses if it does not enter the AES: ∆Y = Y 1 − Y 0. The
observed input choice Y depends on whether or not the farmer has entered the AES:
Y = Y 1D+Y 0(1−D). The individual-level causal effect of the AES is thus not observable,
since only one of the two potential input choices is observed. This is an instance of the
fundamental problem of causal inference [16].
The causal effect might vary across the population. Indeed, constrained households
(for which λY > 0) have to decrease their level of inputs in order to cope with the AES
constraints (∆Y < 0). Unconstrained households (for which λY = 0) could enter the AES
at no cost, i.e. without modifying their agricultural practices, so that the program has
no effect on them (∆Y = 0).4 These households would thus benefit from a pure windfall
effect: they receive a subsidy but do not have to change their practices at all in order to
comply with the AES requirements.
In this paper, we try to recover the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT ),
which is the average effect of the AES on those who have chosen to enter it: ATT =
E [∆Y |D = 1]. The sign and magnitude of the ATT will depend on the relative propor-
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tions of constrained and unconstrained households in the pool of participants. Note that,
as constrained households bear a larger entry cost than unconstrained households, the
latter are likely to be more strongly represented in the pool of participants than in the
whole population. It is thus unsure whether the ATT is strictly positive. In the extreme
case of a program attracting only unconstrained households, the ATT may very well be
null.
Farmers’ decision to enter the AES
Let V 1 and V 0 denote the indirect utility of the household when it is respectively in or
out of the AES program, as defined by equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5). They depend
on the same variables as Y 1 and Y 0. Let V denote the disutility of applying for the AES
in the first period. It depends on the time spent preparing the application, which may
vary depending on the level of education, participation in past programs and possible
assistance provided by agricultural unions. The household decides to enter the AES only
if the expected gain in utility is higher than the costs of application:
D = 1 [E [V1 − V0|I]− V ≥ 0] , (9)
where I denotes the set of information available to the agents when deciding whether or
not to participate in the AES. Selection bias arises because some determinants of farmers’
participation stored in I are also determinants of input demands. As a consequence, par-
ticipants and non participants will differ in terms of fixed factors of production (I), land
quality and managerial ability (µ), consumption shifters (S) and ecological preferences
(δ). Comparing them may thus overstate the causal effect of the program, as participants
may use fewer inputs than non-participants in the absence of the program:
E [Y |D = 1]− E [Y |D = 0]
= E
[
Y 1|D = 1
]
− E
[
Y 0|D = 1
]
+ E
[
Y 0|D = 1
]
− E
[
Y 0|D = 0
]
(10)
= ATT + E
[
Y 0|E [V1 − V0|I] ≥ V
]
− E
[
Y 0|E [V1 − V0|I] < V
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection bias
. (11)
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3.2 Identification strategy
Matching estimators assume that outcomes are mean independent of program participa-
tion conditional on a set of observable characteristics: E [Y 0|D = 1, Z] = E [Y 0|D = 0, Z].
However, for a variety of reasons there may be systematic differences between partici-
pants’ and nonparticipants’ outcomes in the absence of the program, even conditional
on observables. This could lead to a violation of the identification conditions required
for matching. A DID-matching strategy, as defined in Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd
[15], allows for temporally invariant unobserved differences in outcomes between partici-
pants and nonparticipants that closely resemble fixed effects in panel data. Differencing
the outcomes eliminates the selection bias due to these unobservable factors. The condi-
tional parallel trend assumption that underlies DID-matching is: E [Y 0t − Y 0t′ |D = 1, Z] =
E [Y 0t − Y 0t′ |D = 0, Z], with t (resp. t′) a post (resp. pre) treatment date. This means
that observationally equivalent treated and non-treated individuals should exhibit the
same change in input decisions in the absence of treatment, i.e. that their average differ-
ence in input use should be constant over time. DID-matching estimates are obtained by
applying matching to the outcomes differenced with respect to a pre-treatment period.
Three assumptions are needed to ensure that DID-matching recovers the ATT: the Sta-
ble Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), the assumption of conditional parallel
trends and the common support assumption. In what follows, we formulate these as-
sumptions as restrictions on our model, discuss their relevance and propose tests of their
implications.
The Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)
Rubin [29]’s SUTVA assumes that the program has no effect on non-participants. In our
model, this is achieved through the following restriction:
Assumption 1 (SUTVA). The level of prices (pQ, pY , w), the distribution of observed
and unobserved determinants of input use (T, I,S, ,η) and the function g0 remain the
same whether the AES is implemented or not.
Because the AESs that we study have a low take-up rate, and input and output
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prices are mainly determined on the world market, we do not expect the AESs to have
any effects on input and output prices.5 This assumption also rules out imitation effects
or increasing returns, due for example to several farmers creating a co-op to sell their
organic products. Without any prior evidence for this assertion, we set up a test of
the validity of SUTVA based on the proportion of neighboring farmers adopting a given
practice before anyone enters a scheme.
The assumption of conditional parallel trends
A crucial identification assumption in DID-matching is that of parallel trends [2, 15, 25].
It states that, in the absence of the program, the average change in input use is the same
among participants and observationally equivalent non-participants. In our economic
model, the validity of this assumption requires the three following restrictions to hold:
Assumption 2 (Conditional parallel trends). The three following conditions must hold
simultaneously:
(i) I =
{
P, Y¯ , pQ, pY , w, T, I,S,µ, δ
}
,
(ii) (V,µ, δ)  (e,n) | (T, I,S) and (e,n) | (T, I,S) is identically distributed,
(iii) ∃ functions l0 andm0 such that: Y 0 = l0(T, I,S,µ, δ, e,n)+m0(pQ, pY , w, T, I,S, e,n).
Part (i) of assumption 2 states that a farmer’s decision to enter an AES does not
depend on time-varying unobserved factors e (climate variations) or n (idiosyncratic
wage variations). This ensures that selection for the program is based either on observed
variables or on unobserved variables fixed over time. This assumption seems realistic
because participation in AESs is decided two to five years before practices are observed,
meaning that farmers may not be able to forecast the level of the transitory determinants
of input use e and n when deciding to enter the program. Part (ii) of assumption 2
implies that all the dependence between V and Y 0 is due either to observed covariates or
to unobserved time-constant shifters (µ and δ). It also means that transitory variations
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in productivity cannot be correlated to long-term determinants of productivity or tastes.
Such assumptions can reasonably hold, as knowing the long-term mean climate does not
help to forecast the climatic anomalies around this mean level for a given year. Part (ii)
also requires time-varying idiosyncratic shocks to be identically distributed.
Part (iii) of assumption 2 is a way to deal with the bias due to unobserved factors (µ
and δ). It requires that the effect of the unobserved time-constant shifters on input de-
mand be additively separable from the effect of time-varying covariates (e.g. prices). As a
consequence, the average difference in practices between participants and observationally
identical non-participants must be constant over time in the absence of treatment.
Under assumption 2, in the absence of the AES, participants’ and non participants’
average practices follow parallel trends conditional on observed variables:
E
[
Y 0it − Y 0it′ |Di = 1, Ti, Ii,Si
]
= E
[
Y 0it − Y 0it′ |Di = 0, Ti, Ii,Si
]
. (12)
Though it seems difficult to justify on theoretical grounds, assumption 2 is fortunately
testable. We use placebo tests that apply the identification strategy between two pre-
treatment years, t′ and t′′, where no effect should be detected. We find some evidence that
the common trend assumption may not hold in our data. We interpret this as anticipation
effects. Another interpretation could be that farmers follow specific trends in the adoption
of practices. If we weaken assumption 2 and model input level as a linear random trend,6
the matching version of the triple-differences (DDD) estimator of Heckman and Hotz [14]
yields an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect. We implement this estimator as an
additional check of robustness yielding a lower bound on the ATT.
The common support assumption
In order to apply the DID-matching estimator, non-participants having the same observed
characteristics T , I and S must exist for each participant. A sufficient condition for this
to hold is:
Assumption 3 (Common support). Pr(V > E [V1 − V0|I] |T, I,S) > 0.
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Assumption 3 states that, for each level of the observed variables, some farmers have
participation costs higher than the expected utility of entering the AES program. The set
of values of T , I and S for which this assumption is satisfied is called the zone of common
support [15]. This assumption has empirical content because among households with the
same expected utility gain from entering the AES, some have relatively higher participa-
tion costs V because of relatively less substantial assistance from public administrations
at the local level. V thus acts as an unobserved instrumental variable: it determines
treatment intake but is uncorrelated to time-varying determinants of potential outcomes.
As a conclusion to this section, under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, DID-matching identifies
the ATT :7
ATT = E [E [Yit − Yit′|Di = 1, Ti, Ii,Si]− E [Yit − Yit′|Di = 0, Ti, Ii,Si] |Di = 1] . (13)
3.3 Definition of treatment effects with multiple treatments
In practice, farmers can choose from several AESs and may combine two or more of them.
This makes no difference with respect to the way we have encoded our identification
assumptions, but it requires some care in defining treatment effects. Let us suppose that
there are two AESs, a and b and that farmers can enter either one or both. Let it be
assumed that AES a (resp. b) is designed to alter practice Ya (resp. b). Da (resp. Db) is
a random variable equal to one when a farmer chooses to enter AES a (resp. b) and zero
otherwise. We can define four potential outcomes for each practice j ∈ {a, b}:
Yj =

Y 11j if Dj = 1 and D−j = 1
Y 10j if Dj = 1 and D−j = 0
Y 01j if Dj = 0 and D−j = 1
Y 00j if Dj = 0 and D−j = 0,
(14)
where D−j refers to the AES that is not j (i.e. −j = b when j = a). Given that farmers
generally enter various AESs at the same time, we say that a farmer benefits from AES
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a if she receives payments at least for this AES (she may also receive payments for other
AESs). We define a farmer as being untreated if she receives no payment at all for
any AES. So strictly speaking, for the farmers who take AES a, the treatment effect we
estimate in this paper is the average effect of taking AES a (and any other AES that in
practice has been associated with it) upon the practice it was meant to alter, relative to
taking no AES at all:
ATTa = E
[
Ya − Y 00a |Da = 1
]
(15)
= E
[
Y 11a Db + Y 10a (1−Db)− Y 00a |Da = 1
]
(16)
= E
[
Y 11a − Y 00a |Db = 1, Da = 1
]
Pr(Db = 1|Da = 1)
+ E
[
Y 10a − Y 00a |Db = 0, Da = 1
]
Pr(Db = 0|Da = 1). (17)
This parameter is a weighted average of the treatment effect on the respective subpop-
ulations of AES a and b taken together and of AES a taken alone. In order to use this
parameter in cost-benefit analysis, we make the assumption that only AES a (resp. b)
matters for practice Ya (resp. Yb):
Assumption 4 (No crossover effects). For j ∈ {a, b}, Y 10j = Y 11j = Y 1j and Y 00j = Y 01j =
Y 0j .
Under this assumption, there is no indirect effect of AES b on Ya, and thus there
are no complementarities between AESs a and b. We can thus proceed to a separate
cost-benefit analysis for each AES because we have:
ATTa = E
[
Y 1a − Y 0a |Da = 1
]
. (18)
This assumption has some empirical content, so it can be tested:
• First, we can test whether there is a direct effect of AES b on Ya by estimating
E [Y 01a − Y 00a |Db = 1, Da = 0].
• Second, we can test whether there is any additional effect of AES b on top of AES
a by estimating E [Y 11a − Y 10a |Db = 1, Da = 1].
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4 Data
The empirical analysis is based on a database created especially for this study from a
statistical survey of agricultural practices conducted in 2003 and 2005 by the statistical
services of the French Ministry of Agriculture (named “STRU”) paired to both the 2000
Agricultural Census (“CA-2000”) and several administrative files recording information
on the participation in each AES between 2000 and 2006. Creation of the database
required a pairing procedure with several steps to deal with the scattering of the data.
The creation of the database is extensively described in the online appendix. The sample
extracted from “STRU” is representative of French farmers.
4.1 Definition of the participation variables
For each AES, participation is a binary variable taking a value of one when the surveyed
farmer appears in administrative files as receiving subsidies compensating him for meeting
the requirements of the AES between 2000 and 2005, and a value of zero when the
surveyed farmer does not appear in the administrative files between 2000 and 2005.
Because farmers may benefit from several AESs, the participation variables partially
overlap, as shown in the online appendix. The sample size and the number of participants
for the AESs we study in this paper are reported in the online appendix. The sample
contains between 400 and 3,000 participants depending on the AES, which represents
between 2,000 and 14,000 participant farmers nationwide. We also have access to almost
60,000 non-participants, representing 540,000 farmers nationwide.
4.2 Definition of the outcome variables
Several outcome variables are associated with each AES under study. Two outcome
variables allow us to estimate the impact of AESs 0301 and 04 which aim to reduce
nitrogen carried by rainwater runoff: the surface area planted with cover crops for soil
nitrate recovery and the length of fertilizer-free grass buffer strips located at the edge
of agricultural fields which attenuate nitrate leaching. As cover crops may be a way to
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retain nitrogen during winter, we study whether farmers participating in AES 09, which
aims to curb the use of nitrogen fertilizers, have planted more cover crops, even when
not participating in AES 0301. The impact of AES 02, which aims to encourage crop
diversification, is measured by four outcome variables: the area dedicated to the main
crop and the proportion of the total usable arable area (UAA) it covers, the number of
crops, and an index of evenness. Finally, we use two outcome variables to estimate the
impact of the AES which aims to encourage conversion to organic farming: the land area
dedicated to organic farming and the land area under conversion. All areas are measured
in hectares. Pre-treatment outcomes are extracted from “CA-2000” and “STRU-2003”,
the main exceptions being the area cultivated under organic farming (not measured in
2000) and the area covered by grass buffer-strips (not measured in 2000 nor 2003).
4.3 Definition of control variables
The richness of the information in our database enables us to control for most of the
important determinants of input choice and of selection into the program listed in our
theoretical model. We have data on production factors (equipment, buildings, herd size
and composition, composition and size of UAA, size of the labor force, age and education
level of farm associates, etc.) and on the consumption side (composition of the household,
the main non-farm activity of the farmer and his spouse, etc.). The dataset also includes
measures of the technical orientation of the farm, quality labels, past experience with pre-
vious AESs (1993-1999) and other agricultural policies.8,9 The main unobserved variables
are thus managerial ability, ecological preferences and prices. All our control variables
are measured at the farm level with the exception of altitude, slope, agro-environmental
zone and soil carbon content, which are measured at the commune level.10
5 Results
In this section, first we present the practical implementation of DID-matching; then we
present and discuss the results of this estimation procedure. Finally, we present the
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results of the robustness checks based on testing for SUTVA, placebo tests and DDD
estimates.
5.1 Practical implementation of DID-matching
The procedure we use is in line with the most recent developments in the literature
on program evaluation as they are presented in Todd [34]. As they are not a genuine
contribution of this paper, the econometric methods are presented in the online appendix.
The first step of the estimation procedure is an estimation of a probit participation
model for each AES, where control variables are included as explanatory variables.11
We generally find that participants are indeed different from non-participants: they are
younger, more educated, work longer hours on larger farms, and are more likely to have
had previous experience with an AES. Whereas previous experience with quality labels
tends to increase participation in AES 21, technical orientation toward growing cereals
increases participation in all the AESs studied in this paper except AES 21. Overall,
these results suggest a significant selection on observables and they are coherent with
previous empirical studies of the determinants of participation in these AESs [9].
We then estimate the probability of participating in a given AES, conditional on the
control variables (i.e. the propensity score). Following Smith and Todd [32], we define
the common support zone as the set of participants for which there exists a sufficient
density of non-participants with the same value for the propensity score.12 As shown
in the online appendix, restriction to the common support zone generally reduces the
number of recipient farms by 10%. The maximum is reached with AES 21, for which a
quarter of the recipient farms have no untreated counterpart.13
Our main estimator is the local linear matching estimator based on the propensity
score (LLM).14 We estimate standard errors for LLM by using a bootstrap procedure.15
We assess the quality of the matching procedure by comparing the mean level of the
control variables for the participants to that of their matched counterparts. Results
show that differences of covariates among participants and non-participants are largely
removed, meaning that the matching can be considered successful.16
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5.2 Average treatment effect on the treated estimated by DID-
matching
Table 1 reports the LLM estimates of direct and crossover effects of each AES on agri-
cultural practices. Crossover effects are estimated by focusing on farmers not receiving
the AES that has a direct effect on the practice (E [Y 01a − Y 00a |Db = 1, Da = 0]).17,18
Effects of the AESs on crop diversification
Two AES are likely to directly affect crop diversification: AES 0201, which consists of
introducing one new crop into the rotation, and AES 0205, which requires having at least
four different crops in the rotation. The results suggest that AES 0201 has generally
had a stronger impact on outcome variables than AES 0205 (table 1), although there
are fewer participants in AES 0201. These impacts are generally estimated precisely
(ATTs are different from zero at the 1 per cent level of significance). Results suggest that
AES 0201 (resp. 0205) has increased the crop diversity index by .05 (resp. .03). This
is not a strong effect: the diversity index varies from 0 to 1 and is equal to 0.77 (resp.
0.80) on the average recipient farm. On the contrary, these AESs have larger effects
on the number of crops in the rotation: they are responsible for the addition of almost
one crop to the rotation (.85 for AES 0201 and .65 for AES 0205). These contrasting
results can be reconciled by noting that these AESs have had a very limited effect on the
area covered by the main crop: it has only decreased by approximately 2 ha, i.e. only
3 % of UAA. Most of the rotation has thus remained unchanged and the additional crop
has been planted on a limited area. Crossover effects of other AESs are generally lower
than direct effects. All AESs seem to slightly increase the number of crops on the farm.
AES 21 promoting organic farming adds .58 crops to the farm. Other AESs increase the
diversity index, but they do not decrease the area covered by the main crop.
Effects of the AESs on the planting of cover crops and grass buffer strips
AES 0301, which subsidizes the introduction of cover crops into the UAA, and AES 04,
which subsidizes the planting of grass buffer strips, both aim to decrease the transfer of
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pollutants (mainly nitrogen) to ground and surface water. Results displayed in table 1
show that AES 0301 has increased the area planted in cover crops, the average treatment
effect on the treated being around 10 ha. The ATT for AES 04 has not been estimated
using DID-estimators, the outcome variable being unobserved in 2000. The LLM esti-
mator suggests that participants in AES 04 have planted 240 more meters of grass buffer
strips than their matched counterparts (table 1), although this estimate lacks precision.
This AES thus triggered the planting of 1,440 km (=6,000 recipients * 240m) of grass
buffer strips in 2005, which is a low figure compared to a nationwide total of 20,000 km,
largely due to the eco-conditionality of Common Agricultural Policy direct subsidies. We
find evidence that the assumption of no crossover effects is supported by the data in the
case of cover crops. We also find that AESs other than 04, 0201 and 0205 do not have
any significant effect on the planting of grass buffer strips, thereby largely confirming the
absence of crossover effects. The positive effects of AES 0205 may indicate that some
farmers have used cover crops or grass buffer strips to increase crop diversity on their
farms.
Effects of the AESs on the conversion to organic farming
As in the case of the AES 04, the ATT for the AES 21, which aims to encourage the
adoption of organic farming, has not been estimated using DID estimators, because the
outcome variable is unobserved in 2000. This is not likely to lead to a large bias since
farmers entering this AES were required to have no land cultivated by organic farming.
Results suggest that the impact of AES 21 on the area dedicated to organic farming and
the area under conversion is significant. Table 1 shows a difference approximating to 46 ha
between the treated and control groups in the area fully converted to organic agriculture,
and a difference of 4.5 ha in the area in the process of conversion. Furthermore, we do
not detect significant crossover effects of other AESs on organic farming. These results
suggest that AES 21 accounts for 90% of the almost 100% increase in the area devoted
to organic farming between 2000 and 2005 in France.
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5.3 Robustness checks: diffusion effects, placebo tests and DDD
estimates
In this section, we present the results of the tests of the validity of our identifying assump-
tions. We focus in turn on diffusion effects, placebo tests and DDD matching estimates.
Tests of the validity of Assumption 1 (no diffusion effects)
Farmers having converted to organic farming before 2000 may generate imitation effects
and/or increasing returns that make their neighbors more likely to go organic, and also
to enter the scheme paying for this conversion. That means that if there are imita-
tion effects, our estimates suffer from omitted variables bias: the initial proportion of
a farmer’s neighbors that has adopted the practice concerned (organic farming, cover
crops) simultaneously determines selection into the corresponding scheme and outcomes
in the absence of the treatment. We test for the validity of SUTVA by adding the initial
proportion of organic farmers, and farmers planting cover crops, in the farmer’s canton as
control variables. A canton is a larger administrative subdivision containing an average
of 9 communes and is thus likely to represent the extent of a farmer’s zone of influence.
Adding this control variable barely changes our estimated treatment effects for organic
farming (45.5 ha) and planting of cover crops (10.5 ha). We take this as evidence that
SUTVA is not rejected by the data.
Tests of the validity of assumption 2: placebo tests
Placebo tests consist of applying DID-matching to estimate the effect of receiving an
AES after 2003 on the change of practices between 2000 and 2003. Theoretically, no
effect should be detected for this “treated” group. However, these tests are disrupted by
anticipation effects due to the unusually long period of time taken to process administra-
tive applications in 2003. As a consequence, we have performed these tests on groups of
future participants who entered the program at dates further and further removed from
September 2003. If our interpretation of anticipation effects is correct, and if the identi-
fication assumptions behind DID-matching are fulfilled, we should observe a progressive
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decrease in the placebo effect the further removed participation is from September 2003,
and we should obtain a zero effect after some time. Results are presented in table 2.
For AES 0201, the average treatment effects on the number of crops, on the main crop
area, and on the crop diversity index cannot be estimated with a high level of precision
but overall the estimated average treatment effects appear to be small. On the contrary,
for AES 0205, the placebo effect on the number of crops is postive but it exhibits a
decreasing time trend coherent with anticipation behavior. For AES 0301, the average
treatment effect on the cover crop area that we estimate in 2003 on the post-September
2003 group of participants remains around 3 ha until we apply the estimator to the
post-September 2005 group of participants. The average treatment effect then falls to
1 ha, without being statistically different from zero. Results are similar for AES 09.
For AES 21, results conform to the same profile, except that anticipation is very high
but drops more rapidly: it is halved between March and September 2004. Results for
participants who enter the AES later become imprecise due to smaller sample size.
Overall, the results of the placebo tests confirm the importance of anticipation effects
and suggest a small or null time-varying selection bias. These results are consistent with
our knowledge of the administrative procedure underlying the farmers’ participation in
the scheme and thus tend to support the chosen identification strategy based on DID-
matching. However, insofar as we cannot totally reject the hypothesis of a divergence
between the two groups, in addition to the anticipation effect, we also turn to the triple-
difference matching estimator with a view to determining a lower bound on the ATT.
A lower bound on treatment effects: results of triple differences estimates
We apply the triple-difference estimator, which corrects for the divergence estimated in
2003 between the participants and their matched counterparts. This estimator compares
the change in practices between 2000 and 2005 to the change that would have happened
had the 2000-2003 divergence continued at the same pace. Note that the triple-difference
estimator leads to a lower bound on the treatment effect, since it assumes that there are
no anticipation effects and that all the divergence detected in 2003 is due to time-varying
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selection bias.
Results of the triple-difference estimator are displayed in table 3. As we apply this
estimator to a subset of the data (only participants entering the scheme between Septem-
ber 2003 and March 2005 are included in the sample), it could be that the ATT estimated
on this subpopulation is not representative of the treatment effect on the overall pop-
ulation of participants. In order to have an indication of the severity of this problem,
we re-estimate the ATT by DID-matching on this subpopulation. Results are in general
very close to the ones obtained on the overall population. For AES 0201, the average
treatment effect on the main crop area is a reduction of 4%, compared to a reduction
of 5% when estimated by DID-matching. Moreover, the average treatment effect on the
number of crops is an increase of 0.8, compared to an increase of 1.05 when estimated
by DID-matching. Such results indicate that the lower bound for these effects remains
very close to the DID-matching results. For AES 0205, the triple-difference estimates
suffer from a lack of precision. In any case, this does not modify our conclusions based
on DID-matching estimates: the DID-matching estimates already being very low, we ac-
tually expected very similar results from the triple-difference estimator. For AES 0301,
DDD-matching gives an average treatment effect on the treated of around 5 ha, while it
is around 10 ha when estimated by the DID-matching estimator. Although placebo tests
clearly suggest that DID-matching should be preferred, 5 ha is a lower bound on the treat-
ment effect, thereby confirming that this AES exhibits significantly positive additionality
effects. Finally, for AES 21, the triple-difference results do not allow a lower bound to
be provided with precision. However, here again, in accordance with the placebo test
results, we can reasonably suppose that DID-matching results are to be preferred and we
cannot exclude a large effect of this AES.
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6 How much green for the buck? A tentative cost-
benefit analysis
In this section, we insert our estimates of additionality and windfall effects into a cost-
benefit framework. We analyze each AES separately, and we take into account direct
effects only, which is reasonable in view of the limited extent of crossover effects that we
find. We first present a simple framework integrating ATT and windfall effects into a
cost-benefit framework. We define a break-even point in the social benefit generated by
the AES, above which the total net benefit in the presence of the AES is superior to the
total net benefit in the absence of the AES. Second, we calculate this break-even point
for each of the AESs under study. To do this, we combine our ATT estimates with data
on costs extracted from the administrative files. Third, we compare the break-even point
to estimates, taken from the literature, of the social benefit generated by the various
agricultural practices we study. The results of these calculations are presented in table 4.
A framework for cost-benefit analysis
Using assumption 4 (no crossover effects), we can study each AES separately. The varia-
tion of social welfare due to the implementation of a given AES can be measured by the
sum of the compensating variation of farmers and consumers. However, we do not study
farmers’ surplus in this paper because we lack data on profits. We thus adopt a taxpayer’s
view on the program and focus on consumers’ surplus. We assume that the benefit from
a practice is proportional to its average level. B measures the social benefit from one
unit of practice Y . The total benefit generated under the scheme is thus: E [Y 1|D = 1]B,
where E [Y 1|D = 1] is the area subject to the practice in the average treated farm when
it receives treatment. We consider only the direct costs of the program, i.e. direct pay-
ments to farmers, disregarding administrative costs and deadweight loss due to taxation.
Costs associated with the scheme are thus per hectare payments (C) multiplied by the
total area for which the farmer receives payment: E [Y p|D = 1]C. Y p, the area for which
the farmer gets paid, can be different from Y 1. It can be lower if the farmer declares
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more than she plants or higher if the total area subject to the practice is capped and
there are increasing returns from the practice at the farm level. When the treatment
is implemented, the net benefit is thus: E [Y 1|D = 1]B − E [Y p|D = 1]C. This has to
be compared with the benefit that would have been reached had the program not been
implemented: E [Y 0|D = 1]B, where E [Y 0|D = 1] is the counterfactual level of practice
Y . Consumer surplus from the AES is thus equal to:
CS = E
[
Y 1|D = 1
]
B − E [Y p|D = 1]C − E
[
Y 0|D = 1
]
B (19)
= E
[
Y 1|D = 1
]
B −
(
E
[
Y p − Y 1|D = 1
]
− E
[
Y 1 − Y 0|D = 1
]
− E
[
Y 0|D = 1
])
C
− E
[
Y 0|D = 1
]
B (20)
= E
[
Y 1 − Y 0|D = 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ATT
(B − C)−
E [Y p − Y 1|D = 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
E
+E
[
Y 0|D = 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
W
C, (21)
After rearranging, equation (21) shows that consumer surplus depends on the level of ad-
ditionality of the program, measured by the ATT , on the level of discrepancy or declara-
tive error E and on the windfall effectW . We say that the AES is cost-effective whenever
CS > 0, i.e. when the social benefit B is superior to a break-even point B∗:19
B∗ = ATT +W + E
ATT
C, (22)
where B∗ increases with W and E and decreases with ATT .
Toward a cost-benefit analysis
As a first step towards a cost-benefit analysis, we calculate the cost per hectare of the ad-
ditional treatment effect (B∗) for each AES. We then compare the unit costs to estimates
of the social benefit of the practices promoted by each AES. We measure C directly by
dividing total payments by the total area under contract for each farmer. ATT comes
from the LLM estimates of the previous section. W is calculated as the difference between
the observed level of the practice and the ATT . E is the difference between the level of
the practice for which the farmer gets paid (i.e. the total area subject to the AES) and
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the level we measure in the 2005 farm survey. As an intermediate step, we also calculate
the cost per hectare of observed area subject to the practice (C2), by dividing average
payments by the average observed area subject to the practice.20 Finally, we provide
estimates of the social benefit B taken from the literature.
As reported in table 4, in the case of AES 0301 (planting of cover crops), the average
area under contract (21 ha) is slightly larger than that which we actually measured from
survey data (17 ha), which suggests that some farmers committed to planting more cover
crops than they actually did. This translates into a higher cost per observed (81 e) than
per declared (68 e) planted area. Moreover, the additional treatment effect (11 ha) is
equal to 60% of the planted area under cover crops, so that the windfall effect (6.58 ha)
is large. Thus, almost 40% of the planted cover crops area would have been sown by
participants, even in the absence of AES 0301. Mechanically, this windfall effect translates
into a larger cost per planted area than per subsidized area: we indeed estimate a cost
of 131 e per additional hectare of cover crops, while the mean premium for such AES is
only 68 e per hectare. Comparing this to an estimate of the social cost of one kilogram
of N-fertilizer leaching from the field provided by van Grinsven, Rabl, and de Kok [35]
- 0.7 e per kg - suggests a poor cost-efficiency of AES 0301.21 Indeed, for this AES
to be cost-efficient would require one hectare of cover crop to prevent the leaching of
131/0.7=187 kg of N-fertilizer, which seems highly unrealistic. However, if the value of
avoided phosphorus leaching and of increased biological and landscape diversity is taken
into account the cost-effectiveness of this measure would be improved.
In the case of AES 21, farmers converted more land to organic farming than they
were paid for, so that E is negative. This is probably due to a combination of increasing
returns and an informal cap on subsidized area. There is nevertheless a positive windfall
effect: in the end, the cost per additional treatment effect is only slightly lower than the
cost per subsidized area. Finally, subsidizing the conversion to organic farming could
be highly cost effective: it costs 151 e per hectare, whereas some studies tend to show
that the average social benefit from organic farming is higher. For example, Sandhu,
Wratten, Cullen, and Case [31] estimate the average benefit of organic farming relative
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to conventional farming to be 540 e per hectare per year.22
For grass buffer strips (AES 04), in order to compare our estimates with data from
administrative records, we convert the ATT into hectares, under the assumption that a
grass buffer strip is 10 meters wide. Surprisingly, the average area under contract appears
five times larger than the data from the survey would suggest.23 Moreover, there is a
large windfall effect and thus a very small treatment effect. This translates into a cost of
almost 1800 e per additional ha of grass buffer strips, while the mean premium for such
AES is only 93 e per ha. Lankoski and Ollikainen [20] uses an estimate of 1.6 e per kg of
N-fertilizer for the social cost from nitrogen runoff.24 To reach cost-effectiveness, buffer
strips thus have to prevent the runoff of 1800/(1000*1.6)=1.1 t of N-fertilizer per ha.
Cost-effectiveness thus depends on the size of the watershed that leads to the buffer strip.
For example, with an assumed 80% efficiency of the buffer strip and runoffs of 14 kgN/ha,
one kilometer of a 10-m wide buffer strip has to have a cropped watershed of 100 ha to
ensure that the social benefits from this AES exceed its costs (14*100*0.8/1000=1.1).
Moreover, reduced runoff of phosphorus and pesticides and increased biodiversity should
also be taken into account. It thus seems that, despite high associated windfall effects,
AES 04 could very well be cost-effective.
We cannot apply formula (21) to AESs 0201 and 0205 because payments are not tied
to a given practice. We calculate that AES 0201 (resp. 0205) reduces area planted with
the main crop by 2.30 ha (resp. 1.51 ha) on average. This translates into a cost per
additional area not planted with the main crop of 990 e/ha (resp. 2900 e/ha).
7 Conclusion
AESs share with all voluntary programs the potential for large adverse selection. It is
even possible that they only attract farmers that would comply with the requirements
in the absence of payments, thereby generating no additional effects. Overall, we find
that the French AESs that we study do not fit with this extreme scenario. All the AESs
exhibit positive additional effects, even with the most stringent identification strategy.
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We find that the AESs which impose strong requirements, such as the AES aiming to
subsidize conversion to organic farming, have large additional effects and almost nonex-
istent windfall effects. On the contrary, we find that the AESs with modest aims, such
as the AES only requiring farmers to add one crop to the rotation, have generated very
limited additional effects.
For the AESs suffering from large windfall effects, such as the one aiming to subsidize
the planting of cover crops, the comparison of the cost per hectare of additional treatment
effects with estimates of social benefits taken from the literature suggests that this AES
may not be cost-effective. On the contrary, the AESs for which the windfall effects are
small or even null may be cost-effective. The AES aiming to subsidize conversion to
organic farming is a case in point. Because it was directed at conventional farmers only,
the extent of windfall effects is extremely small and cost-effectiveness is high. Denying
subsidies to farmers that adopt green practices out of goodwill is nevertheless ethically
debatable. Formalizing this trade-off between ethics and efficiency is a nice avenue for
further research, for example using insights from fair taxation [12].
Much remains to be done to improve the insertion of treatment effect estimates into a
fully-fledged cost-benefit framework. Estimating farmers’ surpluses from the AES would
be a first step. More importantly, estimating the spatial distribution of treatment effects
would enable a finer comparison with social benefits that undoubtedly vary across space.
Finally, estimating the treatment effects of the AESs directly on the environment remains
an essential but very difficult undertaking. Kleijn et al. (2006) provide evidence that
AESs in the EU enhance common biodiversity. To our knowledge, we lack the same type
of evidence for the effects of AESs on water quality.
Notes
1 We do not explicitly model the dynamic behavior of farmers. Dynamics could play
an important role if there are large learning requirements for entering a scheme or if the
sunk costs for changing practices are large. We do not think that this is the case for most
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of the practices we have studied, with the exception of organic farming. Farmers wishing
to convert to organic farming may have delayed their decision in order to benefit from
AES 21. For our estimates to be correct, we have to assume that the costs of entering the
schemes were not anticipated by the farmers, so that some of those who delayed could
not enter the scheme at a reasonable cost. This is an application of the general result of
Abbring and Heckman [3] that a structural dynamic model with the assumptions in Rust
[30] implies conditional exogeneity assumptions that resemble matching in a dynamic
framework.
2 The discussion of our identification strategy derived from this special case extends
to the other AESs we have studied.
3 This equation is a solution to the set of first-order conditions of the household’s
problem, including those related to labor that are not shown here. We assume properties
of the problem so that such a solution exists.
4 Unconstrained households may also change their practices because of an income
effect due to the payment P .
5 In contrast, measures favoring extensive management of meadows are chosen by
almost the entire eligible population, and the price of land is largely determined at a
local level. Being able to consider the impact of different measures separately enables us
to focus only on the measures for which assumption 1 is most likely to hold.
6 This alternative assumption 2’(iii) is: ∃ functions l0, m0 and k0 such that: Y 0t =
l0(T, I,S,µ, δ, e,n) + tk0(T, I,S,µ, δ, e,n) +m0(pQ, pY , w, T, I,S, e,n).
7 Alternatively, under assumptions 1, 2’ and 3, DDD-matching identifies the ATT :
ATT = E
[
E
[
∆Yit,t′,t′′ |Di = 1, Ti, Ii,Si
]
− E
[
∆Yit,t′,t′′ |Di = 0, Ti, Ii,Si
]
|Di = 1
]
, with ∆Yit,t′,t′′ =
Yit − Yit′ − t−t′′t′−t′′ (Yit′ − Yit′′).
8 The full list of variables can be found in the online appendix. As Chabé-Ferret [7]
shows that controlling for pre-treatment outcomes may bias DID-matching estimates, we
also run DID-matching without controlling for pre-treatment outcomes and find similar
results.
9 Direct subsidies from the CAP are a function of farm structure, which we control for.
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We exclude from the sample farmers benefiting from a special indemnity for covering the
soil in winter that is not part of the AES program. Finally, our results are not sensitive
to the exclusion of the small number of farmers also benefiting from AESs subsidizing
extensive livestock rearing.
10 There are approximately 36,000 communes in France. The average size of a French
commune is around 7 sq.mi, which is a little less than half of the average size of a US
Census Block Group. Using commune level data thereby provides a good enough ap-
proximation for individual farm characteristics like altitude and slope without generating
large measurement errors.
11 The full results can be found in the online appendix.
12 The construction of the common support zone is detailed in the online appendix.
13 In order to understand how the farms on the common support differ from the average
recipient farm, we run probit regressions for presence on the common support. Results
indicate that recipient farmers on the common support are older and have smaller farms
and a lower education level.
14 See Imbens [17] for a detailed presentation of the various matching methods. We
check the sensitivity of our estimates by applying two nearest-neighbor matching estima-
tors: one using the propensity score only and the other using all the control variables
simultaneously. The estimation procedures are detailed in the online appendix.
15 We perform bootstrap at the farm level. The autocorrelation problems studied by
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan [6] are less of an issue in our application: we only use
two periods of data, and our sample is randomized at the farm level, thereby lowering
the degree of spatial autocorrelation.
16 As suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin [28], we use standardized differences to
assess the quality of our adjustment. Before matching, there are around 80 variables that
exhibit large differences, whereas there is at most one large difference after matching with
LLM. The full results of the balancing tests can be found in the online appendix.
17 Estimates of E [Y 11a − Y 10a |Db = 1, Da = 1] are imprecise because of small sample
size. We nevertheless have enough power to reject crossover effects on the planting of
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cover crops.
18 In results not presented in this paper, we estimate the average causal effects of the
AESs on practices measured in 2003 and 2005 for farmers that have entered before 2003
and find very similar results, thereby excluding learning or vintage effects.
19 Note that this condition does not account for farmers’ surplus. We expect it to be
positive though because there is free entry into the program (this is implied by our model,
conditional on I). Rigorously, this is thus a sufficient condition for cost effectiveness.
20 For the sake of consistency, we focus on farms lying on the common support.
21 We have only been able to find one study assessing the social costs associated with
the pollution of drinking water by nitrates [35]. Epidemiological studies suggest that
colon cancer may possibly be associated with nitrates in drinking water [11]. Taking the
increased risk of colon cancer from a case-control study from Iowa, the authors extrapolate
the results to assess the social cost for 11 EU member states by using data on incidence
of cancer, nitrogen leaching and drinking water supply. They estimate the associated
increase in the incidence of colon cancer from nitrate contamination of groundwater-
based drinking water at 3%, which corresponds to 0.7 e per kg of nitrate-N leaching
from fertilizers.
22 To our knowledge no assessment of the social value of organic farming is available
for France, but at least two empirical studies may be used as approximations. Sandhu,
Wratten, Cullen, and Case [31] estimated the economic value of various ecosystem services
provided on arable landscapes in New Zealand. They conducted field experiments to
assess a dozen ecosystem services such as biological control of pests, services provided
by shelter-belts and hedges, nitrogen fixation or mineralization of plant nutrients. For
example, the economic value of the biological control of aphids and flies was estimated
on the basis of avoided cost of pesticides using their cost in New Zealand. Taking the
difference between the estimated value of ecosystem services in organic fields and in
conventional fields, they obtained an estimate of 540 euros per ha per year. Lankoski
and Ollikainen [20] report an alternative estimate of the social benefit associated with
organic farming suggested by Aakkula [1], who used the contingent valuation method to
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elicit a monetary value for conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental
farming in Finland and found an average willingness to pay of 78.4 e per ha. Without
any evidence of the superiority of one assessment over the other, we do not exclude the
idea that subsidizing conversion to organic farming can be highly cost effective.
23 People in charge of conducting the farm surveys acknowledged that there is a large
error in the measurement of the length of grass buffer strips. This is the most likely
explanation of the large discrepancy we find.
24 To the best of our knowledge, there is no study providing an estimate of the social
value of reductions in nutrient runoff based on French data. Following Lankoski and
Ollikainen [20], we thus use an estimate provided by Vehkasalo [36] who approximated
the social benefits of reducing nitrogen runoffs from Finnish farmland by applying the
avoided expenditure method. He estimated the costs associated with nitrogen reduction
at municipal wastewater treatment facilities and found 1.6 e per kg of nitrogen reduced
(for 10-20 per cent reduction). In more recent studies, Lankoski and Ollikainen [21]
drew on Gren [13]’s estimates of the willingness to pay for nutrient load reduction in the
Baltic Sea (4.27 e for one kg reduction in nitrogen). However such estimates appear
too remote from our subject and we prefer to keep to the avoided expenditure estimate,
which appears to be less related to geographical features.
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Table 1: Direct and cross effects of various AESs
0201 0205 0301 04 08 09 21
Eveness .05∗ .03 .02∗∗∗ .03∗∗∗ .02∗∗ .02∗∗∗ .07∗∗∗
(.03) (.02) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.02)
Number of crops .85∗∗ .65∗∗∗ .29∗∗∗ .37∗∗∗ .22∗∗∗ .20∗∗∗ .58∗∗∗
(.36) (0.23) (.07) (.07) (.04) (.05) (.14)
Area under main -.03 -.03∗∗∗ -.006∗ -.01∗∗∗ .002 -.0007 -.01
crop (%UAA) (.03) (.01) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.01)
Area under main -2.30∗ -1.51∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ -.68 2.23∗∗∗ 2.20∗∗∗ 2.71∗∗
crop (ha) (1.34) (.58) (.41) (.62) (.36) (.35) (1.19)
Cover crops (ha) 1.04 1.08∗∗∗ 10.66∗∗∗ .23 -.01 .20 .31
(.79) (.34) (1.32) (.38) (.54) (.60) (.35)
Grass buffer -119.91∗ 192.45∗∗∗ -7.49 243.61 13.54 30.60 -17.10
strips (m) (68.30) (44.64) (38.96) (149.24) (29.67) (28.35) (40.51)
Organic farming -13.39 -6.58 -5.13 11.12 -.50 7.49 46.41∗∗∗
(ha) (45.64) (15.09) (21.07) (26.33) (12.86) (18.93) (0.13)
Under conversion .30 3.96 -3.31∗ .08 -1.46 1.66 4.41∗
(ha) (2.57) (10.67) (1.85) (2.80) (1.73) (2.88) (2.52)
Note: results in bold are the estimates of the direct effect of each AES on the practice it is meant to alter.
Cross effects are estimated on the subgroup receiving AES b but not receiving AES a, the one aiming
at directly altering practice Y a. Estimations use LLM with an Epanechnikov kernel and bandwith set
to .05. Standard errors are in parentheses and are estimated by 500 bootstrapped replications for direct
effects and 100 replications for cross-effects. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1 % (∗∗∗), 5 %
(∗∗) or 10 % (∗) level. UAA refers to Usable Agricultural Area.
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Table 2: Results of the placebo tests
Sample
post- post- post- post- post-
Outcome AES Sept03 Mar04 Sept04 Mar05 Sept05
Main crop 0201 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 ∗ n.a.
(% UAA) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (n.a.)
Main crop 0205 -0.01 ∗∗∗ -0.01 ∗∗∗ -0.01 ∗∗∗ -0.01 ∗ n.a.
(% UAA) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (n.a.)
Crop diversity 0201 0.03 ∗∗ 0.02 0.03 0.03 n.a.
index (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (n.a.)
Crop diversity 0205 0.02 ∗∗∗ 0.02 ∗∗∗ 0.01 ∗∗∗ 0.02 ∗ n.a.
index (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (n.a.)
Number of 0201 0.21 0.09 0.21 -0.12 n.a.
crops (0.19) (0.19) (0.28) (0.31) (n.a.)
Number of 0205 0.33 ∗∗∗ 0.33 ∗∗∗ 0.35 ∗∗∗ 0.19 n.a.
crops (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.19) (n.a.)
Cover crops 0301 3.52 ∗∗∗ 3.60 ∗∗∗ 3.14 ∗∗∗ 3.34 ∗∗∗ 1.32
(ha) (0.60) (0.60) (0.69) (0.80) (1.02)
Organic land 21 6.71 ∗∗∗ 4.91 ∗∗ 5.90 ∗∗ 5.58 n.a.
area (ha) (2.53) (2.35) (2.65) (4.13) (n.a.)
Conversion to 21 13.96 ∗∗∗ 15.58 ∗∗∗ 4.05 4.81 n.a.
organic (ha) (4.39) (4.52) (2.51) (4.02) (n.a.)
Note : asterisks denote statistical significance at 1 % (∗∗∗), 5 % (∗∗) or 10 % (∗) level. Estimations
use LLM with an Epanechnikov kernel and bandwith set to .05. Standard errors are in parentheses
and are estimated by 500 bootstrapped replications. Details on the estimation are presented in the
online appendix. Average treatment effects are estimated successively on the post-September 2003
participants’ group, the post-March 2004 participants’ group, the post-September 2004 participants’
group, the post-March 2005 participants’ group, and the post-September 2005 participants’ group.
For AES 04 only, placebo-tests can not be applied because the associated outcomes are not observed
in 2003. UAA refers to Usable Agricultural Area.
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Table 3: Average treatment effect on the treated for AES in 2005 using DDD-matching
DDD DID DID
Sep03-Mar05 Sep03-Mar05 whole sample
Outcome AES ATT(1) ATT(2) ATT(3)
Main crop (% UAA) 0201 -0.04 ∗∗∗ -0.05 ∗∗∗ -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Main crop (% UAA) 0205 -0.01 -0.03 ∗∗∗ -0.03 ∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Crop diversity index 0201 -0.02 0.03 0.05 ∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Crop diversity index 0205 0.00 0.03 ∗∗∗ 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Number of crops 0201 0.79 ∗∗ 1.05 ∗∗∗ 0.85 ∗∗
(0.38) (0.37) (0.36)
Number of crops 0205 0.07 0.67 ∗∗∗ 0.65 ∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.10) (0.23)
Cover crops (ha) 0301 4.87 ∗∗∗ 10.46 ∗∗∗ 10.66 ∗∗∗
(1.26) (0.97) (1.32)
Organic land area 21 14.07 45.01 ∗∗∗ 50.82 ∗∗∗
(10.11) (6.98) (2.79)
Note : ATT(1) refers to the triple-difference estimates, ATT(2) refers to the DID-matching
estimates on the same sample (farmers who entered the AES between September 2003
and March 2005), and ATT(3) refers to the DID-matching estimates on the whole sample
(farmers who entered the AES before March 2005). UAA refers to Usable Agricultural Area.
Estimations use LLM with an Epanechnikov kernel and bandwith set to .05. Standard errors
are in parentheses and are estimated by 500 bootstrapped replications.
39
Table 4: Cost-benefit analysis of various AESs on the average treated farm
AES 0201 0205 0301 04 21
Payment (e) (P ) 2 271 4 356 1 392 421 7 667
Area under contract (ha)
(E [Y p|D = 1])
13.50 124.75 20.54 4.51 47.20
Observed area subject to the practice
(ha) (E [Y 1|D = 1])
17.24 1.02 54.71
Declarative error (ha) (E) 3.30 3.49 -7.51
Additional treatment effect (ha) (ATT ) 2.30 1.51 10.66 0.24 50.82
Windfall effect (ha) (W ) 6.58 0.78 3.89
Cost per area under contract (C) 168 35 68 93 162
Cost per area subject to the practice
(C2)
81 413 140
Cost per unit of additional treatment
effect (B∗)
987.37 2884.77 131 1 754 151
Social benefit per unit of additional
treatment effect (B)
0.7*Na 1.6*Nb 540
Note: we cannot apply formula (21) to AESs 0201 and 0205 because payments are not tied to a
given practice. We calculate the cost per additional area not planted with the main crop, obtained
from estimates not presented in the previous sections. Na is the number of units of N-fertilizer whose
leaching is prevented by one hectare of cover crops. Nb is the number of units of N-fertilizer whose
runoff is prevented by one meter of grass buffer strips. Sample: treated farms on the common support.
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